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FAITHFUL INTERPRETATION
PHILIP P. FRICKEY*
Upon examining the dialogue among scholars of law and of linguistics,
I was struck by the apparent agreement that, to use Paul Campos's term,
there is no such thing as an "autonomous text."' Texts are not self-evident
repositories of meaning, but instead can make sense only in context.2
Just what context, though? And who decides? On my reading, the
linguists at the conference saw their scholarly task as assessing "language,"
including statutory language, descriptively based on conventional usage.
Because this is an empirical and discoverable inquiry, it is a more
sophisticated and scientific method of identifying textual meaning than that
promoted by "new textualists" such as Justice Scalia, in that it engages in
the empirical investigation of testable hypotheses rather than fireside
intuition and an utterly undue reliance on dictionaries? Nonetheless,
Justice Scalia and other new textualists are not attempting something far off
this mark, at least in those situations where they have stressed ordinary
meaning by reference to what speakers of American English would
generally conclude.4 After all, the new textualists purport to be searching
* Faegre & Benson Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A. University of Kansas
(1975). J.D. University of Michigan (1978). Thanks to Paul Campos, Jim Chen, Bill Eskridge, Dan
Farber, and Holly Brod Farber for helpful comments. In this essay, I have accepted the welcome
invitation of the Washington University Law Quarterly to jettison most of the formal requirements for
a law review article, including citations in support of most propositions. I should also hasten to add that
many of the points I raise in this essay were developed by the participants at the symposium as well
and, in any event, are not novel.
1. See Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the Autonomous Legal
Text, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1065 (1993).
2. For example, even though there was apparent agreement at the symposium that the "no
vehicles in the park" hypothetical would be somewhat different if the prohibition said "no bicycles in
the park," the same problems of context would arise. Illustratively, in many cities, police officers patrol
on bicycles. Would the prohibition apply to such a police officer attempting to apprehend a criminal
who had fled on foot into the park? To take another example, would the prohibition apply to unicycles?
Tricycles? A bicycle built for two? A bicycle with a two-wheeled child carrier attached to it, so that
the "peddled person-propelled vehicle" had four rather than two wheels? In all of these and countless
other practical examples, the textual commandment cannot be sensibly understood by members of the
citizenry subject to the primary duty created, as well as by primary enforcement officials such as the
police and by ultimate interpreters such as judges, without the contextual backdrop.
3. See, e g., Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1437 (1994).
4. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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for some "objective" word meaning that cannot be circumvented by willful
judges. From that perspective, the more scientific and empirical the inquiry,
the better.
In contrast, the legal scholars saw the interpretation of legal language as
a stylized use by legally trained professionals of conventions linked to
normative conclusions about the role of law in society. Even the new
textualists seem to concur, at least insofar as they would allow "established
canons" of statutory interpretation to play a role in their attribution of
meaning to statutory language.' One central reason is that the law is
attempting to accomplish two rather contradictory things. It is attempting,
first, to communicate duties to the citizenry in general and to officials in
particular, a use of language perhaps substantially captured in the linguist's
focus on conventional understandings. Simultaneously, the law seeks to
channel the discretion of enforcement officers and judges to maximize
justice in widely divergent circumstances. Accordingly, the law superimpos-
es on ordinary meaning all manner of canons of interpretation, maxims, and
exceptions (e.g., purpose trumps plain meaning; avoid absurd results). It is
this superimposition of normatively rooted interpretive directions that, for
the legal scholars, makes legal interpretation a specialized treatment of a
specialized language-that is, the work of an interpretive community. For
the linguists, however, as I understand it, the move toward normativity is
simply not the use of language at all, but instead is the subordination of
language to other goals.
To me, a broader concern seemed to surround this dialogue: that of
fidelity to the mission of interpretation. If "interpretation" is defined in a
strictly empirical and verifiable sense, what the legal system does with the
language of positive law hardly qualifies. The division between "is" and
"ought" is, of course, a familiar one in the legal community itself. Every
traditional theory of statutory interpretation wants to have it both ways:
some "objective" limits, usually tied to "the text" or to "established
canons," that promote predictability and inhibit interpretive willfulness, and
some "normative" qualifications that promote justice and fairness.
To illustrate, the literature is replete with references that can only be
understood as supposing that "the text" itself sets boundaries for interpreta-
tion. It is widely recognized that the older forms of "plain meaning"
5. See id. at 404.
6. I say "substantially captured" because law assumes that when legal terms of art opaque to the
public but clear to the lawyer are used, the terms clearly convey their technical legal meaning.
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interpretation,7 as well as the "new textualism, ' are rooted in the notion
that "the text" sets strict limits on legal interpretation. Less well understood
is that the purposive approach of Hart and Sacks9 and at least some
theories rooted in hermeneutics l° also treat the text as having a confining
impact on interpretation. There is no reason why the findings of linguistics
cannot inform what "the text" means in these circumstances. Replacing any
reliance upon "literal meaning" or "plain meaning" with the "conventional
usage," as demonstrated by linguistics, would surely be a welcome
development. After all, both "literal meaning" and "plain meaning" often
look like either what the judge intuits or, worse yet, what the judge
instinctively (if subconsciously) knows best suits her desired result.
Intriguingly, although neither the linguists nor the legal scholars, or for
that matter the legal interpretive theories mentioned thus far, consider
statutory text "autonomous" in a naive way such as acontextual "plain
meaning" or "literal meaning," all of them consider "text" as having some
component (Le., conventional usage) potentially independent of the
meaning intended by the speaker. This conclusion is hardly inevitable.
Campos, for example, considers any autonomy of text from speaker to be
fallacious. For him, to interpret the text is equivalent to ascertaining the
intention of its author(s)." In this conclusion he stands in good company
with several prominent analysts of literary interpretation" and returns to a
theme once prominently developed by a renowned legal scholar. 3 The
text, as an intentional communicative act, is governed by the communica-
tion its utterer intended it to contain.
7 See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
8. For examples of cases that employ "new textualism," see Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. at 404
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment). For general discussion, see, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of
Theor, in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992).
9. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
(court should not give statutory words "a meaning they will not bear").
10. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609
(1990), analyzed in Campos, supra note I.
I 1. That is, the meaning of the text is completely governed by authorial intent, no matter how
difficult to discover, and not merely influenced by the reader's natural speculations about utterer's intent
as part of a pragmatic assessment of the message.
12. See STEVEN KNAPP & WALTER B. MICHAELS, AGAINST THEORY, CRITICAL INQUIRY 723
(1982), reprinted in AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STuDIEs AND THE NEw PRAGMATISM I1 (W.J.T.
Mitchell ed., 1985).
13. See Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLuM. L. REv. 379 (1907).
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One obvious difficulty with this conclusion, of course, is that it can lead
into the "private language" problem often attributed to Wittgenstein.14
Campos acknowledges as much when he concludes that the phrase "the red
fish swims at dawn" must be "interpreted" as equivalent to the intention of
its utterer, whether that be an angler's advice that red snapper is best
caught in the early morning or a spy's secret message that a submarine
sails at sunup. 5
At first blush, it would seem incomprehensible to suggest that a statute
can have the quality of a private language. Statutes that establish primary
duties for the citizenry, are enforced by police agencies, and are interpreted
by publicly accountable judges must communicate by their text messages
that inform ordinary people what they may not do, officials what discretion
they have in enforcing those duties, and judges what equitable authority
they have in handling prosecutions. The enterprise of statutory creation,
enforcement, and interpretation necessarily must be a public one.16
But public in what sense? Linguists might find it troubling that a
community of lawyers would not only understand English words written on
paper in a way inconsistent with conventional usage, but also that they
would then insist that this was the proper interpretation of those words.
Linguists could charge the lawyers with developing a private language
(which, as I understand the linguistic perspective, is an oxymoron) and
foisting it upon an unsuspecting public.
This hypothesized complaint would misunderstand the special way in
which statutory interpretation is "public." To the extent that statutory
interpretive conclusions disagree with conventional (i.e., public) usage of
statutory words, the disagreement is, or at least should be, animated by
other "public" concerns, those rooted in our "public" law. The most basic
and obvious one is the Constitution. For example, if the most likely
conventional usage of statutory words would violate the Constitution, under
traditional dogma the interpreter should prefer a different interpretation, at
least so long as the saving construction is also plausible from the
perspective of conventional usage. Our "public" law also includes
longstanding traditions, such that, among other things, law should be
functional, should avoid absurd results, and should promote justice.
14. See, e.g., SAUL A. KRiPKE, WITrGENSTE1N, ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982).
15. See Campos, supra note 1, at 1089.
16. This point may be less supportable with respect to statutes or rules that are not aimed at the
public at large. For example, leaving pro se litigants aside, it seems less important whether the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence embody conventional usage.
[VOL. 73:1085
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To be sure, this endangers what Pound called "spurious interpretation"
and what Campos called "reauthoring," which happens if the interpreter,
say a judge, rewrites the statute for some reason (e.g., to promote justice,
to reach a practical outcome, to let off persons who have bribed the judge,
to promote personal political agendas, or whatever) in the guise of merely
"interpreting" it. For Pound and Campos, the reauthoring is deviating from
original authorial intent; for linguists, a similar charge could be made about
deviating from conventional usage. Both the "intentionalists" and the
linguists could raise legitimate complaints about interpretive abuse, albeit
they would define it differently.
While admittedly hard to identify and define but nonetheless obviously
a real danger, I would suggest that it is this quality of faithlessness in
statutory (as opposed to literary or other nonlegal) interpretation that
animates the anxieties of statutory interpretation. If, as the participants at
this conference seem to agree, and in which I concur, statutes are
simultaneously somewhat self-defining (so that persons know their duties
and so that official discretion is cabined), yet also instruments of practical
contextual communication (so that the duties and discretion can react
functionally to circumstance) and of social governance (so that larger issues
of public law, such as the Constitution, come into play as well), it becomes
difficult to identify the line separating faithful and faithless enforcement
and interpretation.
Hypotheticals about domestic employees instructed to fetch soupmeatY
however informative about communication in nonlegal contexts, do not
seem to me fully to capture the heart of the problem when the coercive
power of law is involved. A trusted domestic employee, given the task of
long-term maintenance of children, has essentially been delegated the
responsibility to act appropriately in the circumstances, at least in the
absence of absolutely clear and inviolate narrowing instructions." It is far
more debatable whether a legal system could operate with that much
flexibility when primary duties for the general citizenry, and enforcement
and interpretive responsibilities for countless police and judges, are at stake.
My point is that the "faithful" domestic employee may have a good deal
more freedom than the "faithful" police officer or judge, not because of
17. See FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 17-22 (1880). This hypothetical
was imaginatively reconceptualized by Bill Eskridge both at the conference and in WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 53, 56-57, 125-28, 246-47 (1994).
18. Of course, this conclusion is rooted in all sorts of debatable normative and empirical
assumptions,
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anything inherent in language or even necessarily in the actual or presumed
intentions of the author of the instructions, but because of the differences
between life in general and law in particular. This is so even though both
the employee on the one hand and police and judges on the other are in
some sense agents of a principal (the head of the household, the legislature
or, more grandly, "the law"). Literary interpretation seems much further
afield, for I think it hard to justify the conclusion that in that context the
reader is the "agent" of the author in any meaningful sense at all.
If statutory interpretation is a specialized endeavor with the concept of
"faithful interpretation" at its heart, and if such interpretation attempts
simultaneously to reach contextual and functional yet predictable and
nonsubjective conclusions, then we ought to encounter efforts to mediate
these tensions in all theories of statutory interpretation. I think we do,
although some mediating approaches are surely superior to others.
A current formula for textualism is "first, find the ordinary meaning of
the language in its textual context; and second, using established canons of
construction, ask whether there is any clear indication that some permissible
meaning other than the ordinary one applies."' 9 At first glance, step one
of this formulation looks almost entirely acontextual, asking only whether
other language in the same text helps us understand the words at issue. This
first glance may well be deceiving. The term "ordinary meaning" is deeply
ambiguous in this "textual context." It could mean what the linguists call
"conventional meaning," a richly contextual understanding of language
usage. That conclusion is supported in part by noting that new textualists
enthusiastically examine dictionaries on the assumption that they reflect
conventional usage. Moreover, we know lots of contextual information
about the statute: it is written in English; Congress enacted it; it is part of
the law of the United States, and presumably is subject to all manner of
background assumptions American lawyers make about our law; and so on.
Indeed, step two confirms that background context is crucial, for it directs
the interpreter to the "established canons of construction," which are merely
interpretive guidelines that, through dint of sheer judicial repetition, take on
the label of "canon." The more oneaccepts canons aimed at promoting
functional and practical interpretation, the more this kind of textualism
begins to merge with other theories of interpretation. 0 The faithful
19. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. at 404 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. A fundamental question is, of course, what is an "established" canon? Any truly limiting and
"objective" answer to this question seems to me quite hopeless once it is recognized that the Court
makes up new canons and applies them to pending cases, with the consent of the "new textualists." See,
[VOL. 73:1085
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interpreter, then, is not merely a literal reader, but faithful to the many
broader concerns wrapped up in the established practices of the legal
interpretive community. These established practices, more than literal
statutory text or even empirically verified conventional usage, may provide
some promise of predictability and certainty mediated by some search for
justice.2
In contrast to textualism, intentionalism contends that the interpreter
should be the faithful agent of the intentions of the enacting legislature.
Pound captured this idea in what he called "genuine interpretation," and
more recently Campos simply defined "interpretation" as containing only
this inquiry. Both scholars recognized, however, the hydraulic pressure to
engage in what they called, respectively, "spurious interpretation" and
"reauthoring." Indeed, Campos has noted that many legal documents are
not "interpreted" in his sense at all, but rather are treated as "canonical
texts" that, within boundaries established essentially by notions of
faithfulness to a shared enterprise, are reauthored over time by their
interpretive communities.2 On this reading, intentionalism could be seen
as merely a dispute over definitions. To me, it has more important lessons.
It serves simultaneously as a warning against acontextual ascription of
textual meaning and against faithless rewriting in the guise of mere
interpretation.
Under the purposive approach, all law, including statutory law, is a
human, purposive endeavor.' Statutes should be interpreted to promote
their overall organizing purposes, with two basic limitations.24 First,
judicial policies of clear statement, derived from the Constitution, require
that ambiguities in criminal statutes be interpreted favorably to the accused
and that, if one construction of a statute would render it unconstitutional,
e g. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). The Gregory majority, with the agreement of Justices
Scalia and Kennedy, applied a new clear-statement requirement to congressional attempts to regulate
core state functions. In any event, even canons that everyone assumes are "established" go beyond
providing supposedly objective answers and serve functional goals. See, e.g., McNally v. United States,
483 U.S. 350 (1987). The McNally court, with the agreement of Justice Scalia, trimmed apparently clear
language in the federal mail fraud statute to cut off prosecution of state government political corruption.
This interpretation avoided federal interference with state political processes and limited federal
prosecutorial discretion. It was hardly "predictable," much less "objective," however; the dominant view
in the lower federal courts had used a more expansive approach.
21. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 27 (1994).
22. See Paul Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 279,303-10 (1992).
23. See HART & SACKS, supra note 9, at 148.
24. See, e.g., id. at 1374, 1376-77.
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the interpreter should prefer an alternative interpretation that saves the
statute so long as the latter is a permissible one. Second, the interpreter
should avoid any construction that gives the words of the statute "a
meaning they will not bear."25 All of this seems consistent with the attempt
to mediate the goals of certainty and predictability, on the one hand, with
the goal of functionality, on the other. That it can serve neither goal
perfectly is neither surprising nor objectionable.
If faithfulness is the key concept, it is a pity that it is so hard to measure.
I am reminded of an anecdote presented to me in a paper a former student
wrote on statutory interpretation. The paper illustrates well the difficulties
faced by the lawgiver in communicating duties and even the faithful
interpreter in making contextual sense of them:
* * * When I was a student in Hebrew school I was told this joke by a
favorite teacher named Earl Schwartz regarding the commandment to keep
kosher:
The biblical language requires followers to "not cook a calf in its mother's
milk." So when G-d give this commandment to Moses he replied, "I
understand, the people must have separate dishes for milk and meat and
they must never touch." And G-d answered, "No, I said 'Do not cook a
calf in its mother's milk."' Moses replied, "Ab, now I understand, the
people must wait one-half hour after eating milk to eat meat and six hours
after eating meat to eat milk." And G-d repeated, "I said, 'Do not cook
a calf in its mother's milk." Moses nodded his head and said, "What you
mean is that pepperoni pizza and cheeseburgers are out of the question."
This exchange continued for awhile until finally G-d, exasperated,
surrendered to Moses, saying "I give up. Have it your way. 26
What I especially enjoy about this anecdote is that it demonstrates three
crucial aspects of interpretation. First, even when the lawgiver and the
interpreter must, in the circumstances, be conclusively presumed to be
acting in good faith and with optimal effort, lawmaking and subsequent
interpretation are difficult endeavors. The second is that the anecdote makes
sense only when it is assumed-as every reader subconsciously does-that
the interpretation in this setting is part of a larger enterprise, in this instance
the enterprise of the Jewish faith. Interpretation is a method by which a
community-an interpretive community-goes about part of its business.
25. Id. at 1374.
26. Holly B. Farber, The Red Fish Swims at Dawn: A Response to THAT OBSCURE OBJECT OF
DEsiRE: HERMENEutncs AND THE AUTONOMous LEGAL TEXT 7 (Spring 1993) (on file with the author).
I thank Ms. Farber for permission to reprint this story.
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That business might be sacred, aesthetic, regulatory, or otherwise. It is only
by capturing the broader assumptions about the enterprise that we can make
sense out of the lesser included function to be performed by interpretation
for that enterprise. If the religious enterprise aims at sacredness, the literary
enterprise aims at aesthetic pleasure or insight, and the legal enterprise aims
at governing a secular society in a functional and humane manner, we
ought not be surprised that interpretive techniques across these different
communities are far from identic or that within each community the
appropriate technique is subject to debate. Third, if, as in the cases of
religion, literature, and law, once the text is produced it takes on a
perpetual quality and there is no easy method by which the interpreters
have recourse to further instructions, the interpreters must make what they
can of the text in its varying social contexts through faithful implementa-
tion of the enterprise.
Sophisticated legal scholars have never doubted these propositions. For
example, although the new textualism is sometimes condemned for reliance
upon ridiculous assumptions about texts having acontextual meaning, the
more sophisticated practitioners of that craft are innocent of any such
crime. Consider the perspective of Judge Easterbrook. For him, textualism
"rests not on a silly belief that texts have timeless meanings divorced from
their many contexts, not on the assumption that what is plain to one reader
must be plain to any other (and identical to the plan of the writer), but on
the constitutional allocation of powers."'27 The concern, in short, '"is
political rather than epistemological or hermeneutic."' 28 Similarly, Hart
and Sacks developed an elaborate theory of purposive statutory interpreta-
tion based on normative (or, if you wish, political) assumptions about all
law being purposive, legislatures presumed to be made up of reasonable
people pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably, short-term political
currents being essentially irrelevant to interpretation, and the like. Although
they, too, have sometimes been criticized for being naive, the better
understanding of their work is that their assumptions were mostly
normative rather than empirical.
The evaluation of faithfulness, then, must be in relation to the enterprise
27. In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (1989) (Easterbrook, J.).
28. Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Associates, Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook,
J ) (quoting Central States Pension Fund v. Lady Baltimore Foods, Inc., 960 F.2d 1339, 1346 (7th Cir.
1992) (Posner, J.)). In an interesting and as-yet unpublished manuscript, George Taylor carefully
demonstrates that the only plausible defense for textualism turns on political, rather than empirical,
assumptions. See George Taylor, Textualism at Work (unpublished book manuscript, on file with the
author).
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in question, not faithfulness to some "autonomous" text, or conventional
usage, or authorial intent, or other construct. Just what that enterprise
entails can be, and, in the context of statutory interpretation, has been, hotly
contested.
Linguists are not normativists, and this is useful in evaluating the
enterprise of statutory interpretation. What linguists can do, at a minimum,
is help those of us interested in statutory interpretation to keep our "ises"
and our "oughts" straight, to avoid making grand claims of objectivity in
the guise of empiricism when, in fact, our conclusions are rooted in deeply
debatable normative propositions. Illustratively, linguists can usefully
deflate any practitioner of "plain meaning" as "acontextual" meaning.
Linguists can also usefully educate legal interpreters about the breadth and
complexity of "conventional meaning." In addition, linguists could assess
the canons of statutory interpretation, particularly the "intrinsic canons"
based on word meaning and relationship, in light of conventional usage.29
Perhaps most usefully, linguists might consider making their own normative
move, one similar to what apparently animated Campos: don't disguise the
legal interpretive community's complex and normatively driven attribution
of meaning to a statute with the identification of either a "conventional
meaning" in general or with any conventional meaning of "interpretation"
in particular. In other words, those attributing meaning to a statute should
not hide behind the term "interpretation" when, in fact, they are doing
something that Campos would call "reauthoring" and that linguists might
call "making law" as opposed to "discovering conventional meaning." To
the extent that legal scholars and judges hide the normative ball under the
guise of mere interpretation, they do deserve our criticism and, if the
delusion continues, our scorn.
In short, linguists can perform a useful role in policing the practices and
excesses of legal "interpretation." But once the empirical questions are
analyzed with their help and the issues turn more overtly normative, their
assistance to us ends.3" To whom legal interpreters should turn for
assistance in examining law's normativity is a strikingly different question
that, thankfully, is beyond the scope of this essay.
29. The relationship between these canons and Gricean linguistic pragmatics is developed in
Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims ofInterpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1179.
30. Indeed, whether conventional usage should be adopted as a side constraint in legal
interpretation is, itself, a normative rather than empirical question. Thus, although a legal interpreter
might make this choice and find value in the linguists' empirical expertise, this and all the other choices
that the interpreter makes are normative. As Dan Farber and Paul Campos said independently to me in
their comments on this essay, legal interpretation is "normative all the way down."
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